In the final case of the trilogy, the issue before the Court was whether tax credits are available to qualified individuals who purchase health insurance on either Federal or State Exchanges or whether such credits are limited to qualified individuals who purchase health insurance on State Exchanges. The tax credits subsidize the cost of health insurance for lower income individuals and are critical to the achievement of near universal health coverage.
small and large group market; and the American Health Benefit Exchanges[hereinafter Exchanges]. 12 The Exchanges are governmental or non-profit entities that, inter alia, establish, and monitor compliance with, insurance standards and function as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the ability to comparison shop for insurance products. 13 Each state must create and operate, by January 1, 2014, an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals and employees of small employers.
14 Under certain circumstances, a state may participate in a multi-state regional Exchange or establish subsidiary Exchanges to operate within a state. 15 A state may opt out of creating and operating an Exchange in which case the Exchange will be established by the federal government. 16 These Exchanges may be operated exclusively by the Department of Health and Human Services or in partnership with the state with authority over the operation of the Exchange residing within the Department of Health and Human Services. 17 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have established Exchanges. imposition of a shared responsibility payment, a penalty that is to be included with a taxpayer's income tax return for the taxable year which includes the month that such failure occurred. 23 The requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage is variously met through, among other means, Medicare or Medicaid coverage, individual insurance policies, or eligible employersponsored group health plans or insurance coverage. 24 An applicable individual is an individual other than an individual who qualifies for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, who is not a citizen or national of the United States or a legal alien present in the United States, or who is incarcerated. 25 No penalty is imposed on individuals whose required contribution exceeds eight percent of household income. 26 The required contribution for individuals who are eligible only to purchase insurance in the individual market is the annual premium for the lowest bronze plan available in the market in which the individual resides reduced by the amount of any credit available under section 36B. 27 The tax credit, discussed subsequently, reduces the amount of a taxpayer's required contribution and thus potentially reducing the number of taxpayers who would be entitled to this exemption. 28 Finally, individuals with very low incomes, members of 23 
I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)-(2)( CCH 2015 ). ). Recent government estimates anticipate that approximately six million households may be subject to the individual mandate for 2014. See
Stephanie Armour, Millions Face a Health-Insurance Penalty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2015, at A3. No penalty is imposed for gaps in coverage of less than three months. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4)( CCH 2015 ). The penalty is assessed and collected in the same manner as other assessable penalties but neither criminal penalties may be imposed nor criminal prosecution undertaken for failure to pay the penalty. Moreover, liens and levies to collect unpaid penalties are prohibited. I.R.C. § 5000A(g) ( CCH 2015 ) . 24 I.R.C. § 5000A(f) ( CCH 2015 ) . Policies whose medical coverage is secondary to the primary purpose of the policy, such as auto insurance policies, credit insurance policies, and workers' compensation coverage are not deemed to provide minimum essential coverage. Also, minimum essential coverage is not provided by policies whose coverage is limited to medical treatment received at on-site medical clinics or for specific illnesses or diseases. See I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(3)( CCH 2015 ); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(c)( 2010 ). 25 I.R.C. § 5000A(d) ( CCH 2015 ) . 26 I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) ( CCH 2015 ) . 27 I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii) ( CCH 2015 ) . Bronze level coverage is designed to provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated benefits. 42 U.S.C. § § 18022(b) ; 18022(d) (2010) . Silver, gold, and platinum coverage levels provide benefits that are actuarially equivalent to 70, 80, and 90 percent of the full actuarial value of statutorily enumerated benefits, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d) ( 2010 ) . See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax credit allowable under § 36B. The required contribution for an individual eligible for coverage under an eligibleemployer sponsored plan is the annual premium which would be paid by the individual for selfcoverage. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(i) ( CCH 2015 ) . 28 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
Indian tribes, and bona-fide residents of any possession of the United States are not subject to the penalty. 29 The amount of the penalty due for a taxable year is the lesser of the sum of the monthly penalty amounts or the amount of the national average insurance premiums for a particular level of coverage for the applicable family size involved that is offered through insurance Exchanges. 30 The monthly penalty amount is one-twelfth of the greater of a flat dollar amount or a percentage of income. 31 A significant portion of health insurance is delivered to individuals through their employers. This system, aided and abetted by income tax subsidies, had its genesis as a mechanism to avoid wage controls during World War II. 32 The addition of section 4980H to the 29 I.R.C. § § 5000A(e)(2)-(3); 5000(f)(4)(B) ( CCH 2015 ) . Bona-fide residents of possessions of the United States are deemed to have minimum essential coverage and, therefore, are not subject to the penalty. See I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(4)(B) ( CCH 2015 ) . 30 I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1)( CCH 2015 ). The national average premium is determined for plans that provide a "bronze" level of coverage. See supra note 27. The monthly national average bronze plan premium for 2015 is $207 per individual and $1,035 for a family with five or more members. Rev. Proc. 2015-15, 2015 IRB LEXIS 53 ( Jan. 17, 2015 ). The use of the national average premium rather than state average premiums avoids the possibility that the shared responsibility payment violates the uniformity requirement for taxes that are not direct taxes. Congress's power to tax is expansive but it is not unlimited. In addition to the constitutional limitations applicable to the exercise of any federal power, there are structural limitations specific to the taxing power. Certain taxes must be uniform. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl.1. The precise contours of the uniformity requirement was subject to some debate during the first century of the republic but it now refers simply to geographic uniformity -federal tax rates must be the same throughout the United States. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 ( 1900 ). The uniformity requirement rarely surfaces as a point of contention, perhaps due to the political difficulties that would be encountered in enacting a provision that overtly disfavored a particular geographic region, but on occasion the issue does arise. See e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74,86 ( 1983 )( stating that an exemption from an oil profits tax for certain Alaskan oil did not provide Alaska with an undue preference over other states ). . The tax base for the percentage of income penalty amount is the taxpayer's household income in excess of the amount of gross income that is necessary to impose a duty on the taxpayer to file an income tax return. I.R.C. § § 5000A(c)(2)(B); 6012(a)(1)( CCH 2015 ).
The penalty was equal to one percent of the tax base in 2014, is two percent of the tax base in 2015, and will be two and one-half percent of the tax base thereafter. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B) ( CCH 2015 33 This provision imposes an exaction on certain employers if they either do not offer insurance coverage to their employees or offer coverage that is deemed inadequate under the statute. 34 An assessable payment is imposed on employers with an average of fifty or more full time or full time equivalent employees if such employers fail to offer affordable minimum essential health care coverage to their full time employees and one or more such employees qualify for the tax credit or premium subsidies. 35 subsidies to higher income individuals, masks the true cost of coverage to the insured resulting in the overconsumption of medical care, and distorts labor market mobility due to lack of portability. See id. at 8-14. The tax subsidy that results from tax exempt income is dependent upon the marginal tax rates of the taxpayer who receives such income. The Cir. 2011 ). The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits, subject to few exceptions, any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." I.R.C. § 7421(a) ( CCH 2015 ) . In Sebelius, the Court also held that despite the status of the individual mandate penalty as a tax for constitutional purposes, the penalty was not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Nat'l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2594. In light of its holding in Sebelius, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679 ( 2012 ( CCH 2015 ) . For this purpose, minimum essential coverage has the same meaning as it has for purposes of the individual mandate imposed by I.R.C. § 5000A. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H-1(a)(27) ( 2014 ). A full-time employee is defined The Obama administration has twice delayed the enforcement of these provisions. In 2013, the I.R.S. issued a notice that enforcement of this provision would be delayed until 2015.
36
In 2014, final regulations were issued that further delayed its enforcement until 2016 for employers with less than 100 full time equivalent employees or for those employers with 100 or more full time equivalent employees that provide affordable health insurance coverage to at least seventy percent of employees. 37 The delays have generated controversy because the statute does not authorize such delays.
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In addition, an excise tax is imposed in the amount of $100 per day for each affected individual if the group health plan does not conform to the requirements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 39 The application of both section 4980H and the excise tax were at as an employee who is employed an average of at least 30 hours per week. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A) ( CCH 2014 41 An individual who is covered under any eligible employer-sponsored plan or who is offered health insurance coverage through an eligible employer-sponsored plan under which the employee's required contribution with respect to the plan does not exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer's income and which covers at least 60 percent of total benefit costs are not eligible for the credit. 42 The credit is designed to subsidize health insurance coverage for taxpayers whose income does not exceed 400 percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved. 43 The credit is 41 I.R.C. § § 36B(a); 36B(c)(2)(A) ( CCH 2015 ) . Advance payments of the credits may be made in the form of reductions to the monthly insurance premiums and such advance payments reduce the amount of the credit under § 36B. I.R.C. § 36B(f)(1)( CCH 2015 ). In the event that advances exceed the credit amount to which the taxpayer is entitled the excess amount advanced increases the income tax owed by the taxpayer subject to certain limitations based on the level of the taxpayer's household income. I.R.C. § 36B(f)(2)( CCH 2015 ); Treas. 44 In effect, the credit subsidy is limited to the excess of the premium cost of a baseline plan over a percentage, which increases as the taxpayer's household income approaches 400 percent of the poverty line, of the taxpayer's household income. 45 The allowance of a tax credit can trigger the applicability of the individual mandate with respect to the individual entitled to the credit. 46 The (CCH 2015 ) . In the event that a qualified health plan offers benefits in addition to the essential health benefits required to be provided by the plan or a state requires that such additional benefits be provided under the plan the portion of the premium properly allocable to such additional benefits are not taken into account. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(D)(CCH 2015 ). See supra note 27 for an explanation of "silver" plans. 45 The applicable percentage varies from a minimum of 2 percent to a maximum of 9.5 percent subject to adjustment after 2014 to account for the possibility that health insurance costs increase faster than the rate of income growth. Additional adjustments are to be made beginning in 2019 if premium cost increases exceed the growth in the consumer price index and the subsidies exceed a certain level of gross domestic product. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A) ( CCH 2015 ) . Household income is the sum of the modified adjusted gross income of all individuals who were taken into account in determining the taxpayer's family size and were required to file a tax return for the taxable year. Modified adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income plus foreign income excluded under I.R.C. § 911, tax exempt interest, and non-taxable social security benefits. I.R.C. § 36B(d)(2)(CCH 2015 ). The federal poverty line is the most recently published poverty guidelines as of the first day of the regular enrollment period for coverage through an Exchange for the calendar year. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(h) (2012 ) . 46 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. such individual and, therefore, mandated. 47 In addition, the penalty imposed on employers by section 4980H is triggered by the attainment of a credit or cost sharing reduction by one employee.
48 Section 36B's language appears to limit eligibility for a tax credit to taxpayers who are enrolled in State Exchanges. 49 However, regulations were issued pursuant to which participants in Federal Exchanges would also qualify for the credit. 50 Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, stated that approximately 87 percent of Federal Exchange enrollees qualified for tax credits. 51 According to the Congressional Budget Office, the average tax credit for 2014 was $4,330.
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II. COURT DECISIONS
A. Circuit Court Split
Several Virginia residents challenged the validity of the regulations that entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to tax credits . Virginia did not establish an Exchange and its residents are served by the Federal Exchange, HealthCare.gov. The availability of credits pursuant to the regulations caused these Virginia residents to be subject to the individual mandate because the allowable credits rendered their insurance costs affordable under the statute. 53 The Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's holding that the statute as a whole evinced Congress's intent to make the credits available nationwide and, consequently, the regulations were within the Treasury's authority. 54 The court applied the two-step framework set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.
55 First, the court held that the statutory language did not clearly and unambiguously reveal the intent of Congress with respect to the availability of tax credits for individuals enrolled on Federal Exchanges. 56 Although the language of section 36B clearly referred only to Exchanges established by a State, the court refused to "'confine itself to 47 I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii) ( CCH 2015 ) . 48 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 49 See supra note 41and accompanying text. 50 examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.'" 57 The court believed that section 1311, the provision authorizing State exchanges, section 1321, the provision authorizing Federal Exchanges, and a definitional provision of the Act could plausibly be read to treat Federal Exchanges as Exchanges established by a State. 58 In effect, all Exchanges are State Exchanges. 59 The court also found that two other statutory provisions were irreconcilable with the appellants' assertion that section 36B denies the availability of credits to taxpayers enrolled on Federal Exchanges. First, the information reporting requirements of section 36B apply to all Exchanges and these requirements mandate the reporting of credit information. 60 The court believed that the imposition of such a reporting requirement on Federal Exchanges belied the notion that credits are unavailable to taxpayers enrolled through such Exchanges. 61 Secondly, only "qualified individuals" are eligible to purchase insurance from the Exchanges and, because such term is defined as a person who resides in the State that established the Exchange, the appellants' interpretation of the statute would leave a Federal Exchange with no eligible customers. 62 The court found little guidance in the legislative history of the statute. Several floor statements by Senators indicated that all taxpayers would have access to the credits. 63 However, such statements could have been made under the assumption that all states would establish Exchanges and that denying credits to taxpayers that enrolled through Federal Exchanges would serve as an inducement to states to establish their own Exchanges. Having found that Congress did not speak directly to the precise issue raised by the appellants, the court proceeded to the second prong of Chevron's framework -a determination of whether the regulations were based on a permissible construction of the statute. 65 Under Chevron, a court will not disturb an agency's interpretative authority so long as the interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 66 Under this highly deferential standard, a regulation that is reasonably accommodative of conflicting policies committed to an agency's care by the statute will be upheld. 67 Ambiguities in a statute may be resolved through consideration of policy arguments rationally related to the statute's goals. 68 In this case, the objectives of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and to decrease the cost of health care. 69 According to the court, the broad availability of tax credits to subsidize the cost of health insurance is congruent with the statute's objectives. 70 In Halbig v. Burwell, the D.C. Circuit had before it a similar challenge to the I.R.S. regulations brought by individual appellants who resided in states that did not establish 65 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d at 372. 66 Id. The appellants asserted that the Exchanges are administered by the Department of Health and Human Services and, therefore, the I.R.S. did not have the authority to issue the regulations in question. The court rejected this assertion because I.R.C. § 36B delegated to the I.R.S. the authority to resolve ambiguities in the statute. Id. at 375. The appellants further asserted that Chevron deference does not apply because tax credits and exemptions are to be construed narrowly. According to the court, Chevron deference is not displaced in tax matters and, in fact, was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Mayo Found. for Medical Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 ( 2011 ). Id. at 375-76. Prior to Chevron, the Court applied a less deferential, multi-factor test to determine whether agency regulations were a permissible interpretation of a statute. Under this test -the so called National Muffler test, the courts examined whether the regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the statute promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent; the length of time that the regulations were in effect; the degree of reliance placed on the regulations by affected parties; the consistency of the agency's position; and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by Congress during subsequent reenactments of the statute. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 ( 1979 ) 247, 253 ( 1981 ) . However, the Court did away with the distinction between these two types of Treasury regulations in Mayo and held that the Chevron standard applied to all Treasury regulations because it acknowledged that the administrative landscape had changed over the years and that no special rules were warranted for tax regulations. Accordingly, like any other agency regulations, tax regulations, regardless of their source of authority, are entitled to Chevron deference. Mayo Found. for Medical Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 55-56. 67 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d at 372. . 68 Id. at 373. 69 Id. at 373-74. 70 Id. at 374-75.
Exchanges. 71 In a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the district court's judgment upholding the validity of the regulations. 72 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the court found no need to proceed to the second prong of the Chevron framework because it believed that Congress did speak directly to the precise question at issue. According to the court, Federal Exchanges are equivalent to State Exchanges in certain respects but they differ from State Exchanges in one crucial respect. They are not established by a State as required by the language of section 36B. 73 Section 1321 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the provision that authorizes Federal Exchanges, omits any language that suggests that such Exchanges should be treated as State Exchanges. 74 Moreover, the court noted that Congress was capable of establishing equivalency between Exchanges as evidenced by the statutory language creating such equivalency with respect to Exchanges established in possessions of the United States. 75 Congress's use of dissimilar language in different parts of a statute is presumed intentional. 76 The court also rejected the government's contention that all Exchanges are, by definition, established by a State. 77 The court then proceeded to examine whether the so-called absurdity doctrine was applicable. This doctrine avoids statutory constructions that would render a statute nonsensical, superfluous, or would result in an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that such an interpretation belies Congressional intent. 78 In deference to separation of powers principles, however, this doctrine is narrowly applied, requiring a "'high threshold' of unreasonableness before we conclude that a statute does not mean what it says."
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In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the court did not consider the reporting obligations imposed by section 36B on all Exchanges as evidence that Congress intended that tax credits be available to enrollees on Federal Exchanges. 80 The reporting obligations go well beyond tax credit information and the fact the tax credits are unavailable for individuals enrolled on Federal Exchanges does not render these obligations nonsensical in the context of such Exchanges. The reporting obligations merely render the statute over-inclusive -a problem that exists in section 36B whether or not tax credits were available to enrollees on all Exchanges. 81 The court also rejected the government's assertion that its construction of the statute would leave Federal 82 According to the court, such Exchanges could have customers. These customers would not be "qualified individuals" but they would customers nonetheless. 83 Finally, the court rejected the government's contention that its construction of the statute would impose a perpetual obligation on states that declined to establish Exchanges to refrain from tightening their Medicaid eligibility rules. 84 Such an obligation is imposed on a state until it has established a fully operational Exchange. 85 However, the reservation of Medicaid benefits for residents of a state for which no tax subsidy is available appeared logical to the court. 86 Despite the fact that the court believed that the statutory language was unambiguous, it did proceed to examine the legislative history of the statute in an attempt to glean some kernel of congressional intent -a task it did not concede was necessary in this case. 87 The best evidence of congressional intent is the legislation which Congress enacted and legislative history, with but a secondary role in discerning such intent, is to be enlisted only when the '"literal application of a statute will [not] produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. '" 88 Quoting from its own precedent, the court stated that it should depart from the plain meaning of statutory language only upon a '"most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions." 89 In the court's opinion, the legislative history failed to provide demonstrable evidence that Congress intended to provide tax credits to eligible enrollees on all Exchanges. The court found the legislative history inconclusive in this respect and believed that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the limitation of credits to enrollees on State Exchanges was a means to incentivize states to establish their own Exchanges. 90 The court, moreover, refused to countenance the absence of any suggestion in the legislative history that credits be so limited as evidence of an intent to the contrary. 91 Silence is not evidence that Congress meant something other than what it said. 92 The court also rejected the government's argument that the broad purposes of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act -near universal health insurance coverage and lower costs 82 Id. at 404-05. The Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 83 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d at 405. 84 Id. at 405-06. 85 Id. 86 Id. at 406. 87 Id. at 406-07. 88 Id. at 407 ( internal citations omitted ). 89 Id. ( quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dep't of Labor Wage Appeals Bd., 932 F.2d 985, 990 ( D.C. Cir. 1991 )). 90 Id. at 408. 91 In the Explanation of Provisions and Summary of Comments that accompanied the issuance of the final regulations, the I.R.S. did not cite to any specific statutory provision, other than a general reference to I.R.C. § 36B itself, in support of its position. Instead, it justified its position by reference to "other provisions of the Affordable Care Act" and by the fact "that the relevant legislative history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges." Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 37077, 37078 ( May 23, 2012 ). 92 Halbig v. Burwell, 757 F.3d at 408.
for such coverage -evidenced that Congress had no intention to limit tax credits to individuals enrolled through State Exchanges. 93 Despite the fact that the individual mandate, the employer mandate, the insurance subsidies, and the insurance market reforms work together as a cohesive scheme to achieve the legislation's purposes, the legislation itself belies the government's contention that the limitation on the tax credits urged by the appellants would have been inconceivable to Congress. The legislation exempted residents of the United States' possessions from the individual mandate yet the insurance market reforms were made applicable to the possessions. 94 The adverse selection problem caused the insurance reforms without a corresponding individual mandate was also in evidence in the long-term care provisions of the legislation that Congress repealed in 2013. 95 Whether or not Congress tolerated an adverse selection problem in the possessions because it represented only a small segment of the insurance market or whether Congress was willing to tolerate such a problem more broadly is a question that the legislative history leaves unanswered.
B. Supreme Court Decision
On June 25, 2015, in King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and held that enrollees on Federal Exchanges are indeed entitled to tax credits. 97 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, briefly reviewed the economic underpinnings of the legislation. He noted that earlier efforts by various states to expand individuals' access to health insurance coverage failed to achieve their objectives. 98 These efforts coupled some form of guarantee issue and community rating requirements to assure that health insurance coverage was available to individuals seeking coverage and that such coverage was not denied or discriminately priced due to pre-existing medical conditions. 99 However, these reforms sowed the seeds of their own failure. Guarantee issue and community rating rules assured that insurance would be available, at a reasonable price, when needed thereby exacerbating the phenomenon of adverse selection -the propensity for individuals to purchase insurance when they become ill. 100 As a result, the insured pool increasingly skewed toward the sick causing premiums to rise and thus further encouraging adverse selection. This process, referred to by the Chief Justice as a "death spiral," eventually led to insurers abandoning the market altogether and, as a consequence, the number of uninsured individuals increased significantly. 101 Chief Justice Roberts contrasted the experience of the states of Washington and New York, both of which experienced this death spiral after enacting reforms in the 1990s, with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
102 Like Washington and New York, Massachusetts adopted guarantee issue and community rating requirements in the 1990s but, unlike her sister states, 93 Id. at 408-09. 94 Id. at 410. 95 Massachusetts later required individuals to purchase insurance or otherwise face a financial penalty and provided tax credits to subsidize the cost of the mandated insurance to certain individuals. 103 These additional measures proved successful and the number of uninsured individuals in Massachusetts fell to the lowest rate in the nation. 104 The combination of guaranteed issue and community rating to make insurance available, mandatory coverage to reduce adverse selection, and subsidies to increase affordability underpins the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
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Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to analyze the I.R.S.'s interpretation of section 36B. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court did not examine the regulation through the lens of Chevron. According to the Court, the deference afforded administrative agencies in their interpretations of statutory ambiguities under Chevron is premised on the notion that such ambiguities "constitute an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps."
106 This implication may be unwarranted in "extraordinary cases" and, according to the Chief Justice, this legislation is one such case. 107 The tax credits are among the Act's key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep "economic and political significance" that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. . . . It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort. . . . This is not a case for the IRS. 108 The Court noted that statutory language that is plain is enforceable according to its terms but whether such language is, in fact, plain "'may only become evident when placed in context . . . and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme"' 109 The Court examined the definitional provisions of the statute and, similar to the Fourth Circuit, found that the most natural meaning of the definitional provisions would result in no qualified (2000)). The admonition that language must be placed in context reminds me of a scene from the motion picture, The Paper Chase. In the scene, a third year law student tutors one of the main characters, a first year law student. The third year law student poses a hypothetical case to the first year law student. In the hypothetical, a statute requires that premises be maintained so that they are free from dangerous ice. The Court found it possible to interpret the language of section 36B either to limit tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges or to permit enrollees on both State and Federal Exchanges to qualify for tax credits. 113 However, it believed that the statute intended equivalency between the two types of Exchanges. 114 Denying tax credits to enrollees on Federal Exchanges would create a fundamental difference between the two types of Exchanges. State Exchanges would help make health insurance affordable and Federal Exchanges would not. 115 The Court rejected the notion that if Congress intended the tax credits to be available for qualified individuals enrolled on all Exchanges then the words "established by the State" would have been unnecessary. 116 The Court noted that its preference for the avoidance of surplusage is not an absolute rule and that the application of such preference was particularly unwarranted in this case. 117 The legislation was poorly drafted due, in large part, to the political machinations that were employed in order to secure its passage.
118 Accordingly, the Court found that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State" to be ambiguous.
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As previously noted, the Court did not defer to the I.R.S. for the resolution of the statute's ambiguity. 120 Instead, it turned to the broader structure of the legislation to clarify the ambiguity. According to the Court, a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would "likely create the very 'death spirals' that Congress designed the Act to avoid."
121 Such an interpretation would run counter to the canon that federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their own stated purpose. 122 The Court rejected the assertion that Congress believed that the absence of tax credits for Federal Exchanges would entice the states to establish their own Exchanges. 123 In contrast, the Court believed that the establishment of Federal Exchanges as a response to a state's unwillingness to establish its own Exchange was evidence that Congress did, in fact, contemplate state reluctance to cooperate and created a fallback to deal with such reluctance. 124 Finally, the Court delved into the intricacies of section 36B and noted that the denial of tax credits to enrollees on Federal Exchanges, if such credits are to be denied, becomes evident 123 Id. at 499-500. 124 Id. at 500. only after delving into a "sub-sub-sub section" of the statute. 125 Due to the fundamental importance of the tax credits to the overall statutory scheme, the Court believed that a congressional intent to deny such credits would have been made known in a prominent way and not buried in the interstices of the statute. 126 Invoking Marbury v. Madison, the Court believed its resolution of the ambiguity in favor of the government prevented the undoing of the legislation thereby respecting the role of the legislative branch. 127 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, acerbically disagreed with the majority's conclusion. Justice Scalia believed that Congress could not have "come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to State Exchanges than to use the words 'established by the State.'" 128 The dissent conceded that statutory interpretation should not take place in isolation and that context always is a relevant consideration. However, context "is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them."
129 Justice Scalia disagreed with the Chief Justice's belief that the phrase "established by the State" was surplusage caused by the circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation. Redundant language, according to Justice Scalia, is commonly used by lawmakers but the majority rendered the phrase in question a nullity thereby violating a virtually absolute principle of statutory construction. 130 Moreover, this language was repeated seven times throughout the statute but it was not repeated throughout the entire statute. 131 Common sense dictates that the use of a phrase in some cases and another phrase in other cases indicates that the two phrases have contrasting meanings. 132 The dissent also believed that the majority's interpretation rendered various statutory provisions nonsensical. Several provisions of the legislation mandated state officials to undertake certain tasks related to the administration of Exchanges. The dissent questioned how a state official possibly could undertake those tasks for an Exchange that is operated by the federal government. 133 The dissent also disagreed that the statutory language evidences the intent to treat Federal and State Exchanges as equivalent. Whether or not Federal Exchanges were authorized as a fallback in the event of state inertia, a Federal Exchange is not a State Exchange. Invoking the principle that specific terms govern over general terms, even if it were true that Congress intended to equate the two types of Exchanges in general, for the specific purpose of the tax credits the two types of Exchanges are not equivalent. 134 The fact that a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would leave Federal Exchanges with no qualified individuals did not move the dissent. In fact, the majority's reliance on this result to come to a contrary conclusion was, according to Justice Scalia, " [p] Imagine that a university sends around a bulletin reminding every professor to take the interests of "graduate students" into account when setting office hours, but that some professors teach only undergraduates. Would anyone reason that the bulletin implicitly presupposes that every professor has "graduate students" so that "graduate students" must really mean "graduate and undergraduate students"? Surely not. Just as one naturally reads instructions about graduate students to be inapplicable to the extent a particular professor has no such students, so too would one naturally read instructions about qualified individuals to be inapplicable to the extent a particular Exchange has no such individuals. 136 Moreover, the dissent, unlike the majority, found nothing unusual in the structure of section 36B. The fact that the limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges, if such limitation did indeed apply, is found in a formula provision -a sub-sub-sub section according to the majority -rather than a definitional provision is of no moment. 137 Such drafting is not unusual in the Internal Revenue Code.
138
Justice Scalia then directed his attention to the legislation's design and purpose and was similarly critical of the majority's conclusions in this respect. The notion that the health insurance market would be destabilized by the lack of tax subsidies to enrollees on Federal Exchanges, if true, merely reveals a flaw in the law and is not proof that the statute does not mean what it says. 139 Moreover, this flaw existed, without dispute, in the long-term care insurance program established by the legislation and in the general insurance market in the Federal Territories. 140 Justice Scalia proceeded to accuse the majority of considering the law's purpose in isolation and ignoring other competing purposes. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act displays a congressional desire for state participation in the establishment and management of Exchanges. 141 The majority's conclusion frustrates this goal. 142 In fact, a contrary holding would encourage states to establish their own Exchanges thereby achieving the market reforms desired with active state participation. 143 Finally, the dissent took umbrage at the majority's reaction to its belief that this dispute was the result of inartful drafting caused, in part, by the Congress's lack of due care and deliberation. It is not the role of the Court to amend a law that says what Congress did not intend to say or "to make everything come out right when Congress does not do its job properly." 144 Justice Scalia, referring to this case and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, concluded by accusing the majority of results driven jurisprudence. "We should start calling this law SCOTUScare. . . . And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme 136 Id. 137 Id. at 507-08. 138 Id. at 508( referring to several other tax credit provisions ). 139 Id. at 509. 140 Id. at 509-10. 141 Id. at 510. 142 Id. 143 Id. at 510-11. 144 Id. at 512.
Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites." 145 Both the majority and dissenting opinions, enlisting as they did an array of canons of statutory interpretation, are persuasive. I suspect that I am not the only person whose agreement or disagreement with the Court's holding is largely dependent on pre-existing policy preferences and, perhaps, political ideology. However, the Court's handling of the Chevron issue raises troubling separation of powers issues. Moreover, the Court's standing jurisprudence is difficult to square with its handling of this issue.
III. CRITIQUE
A. Chevron and the "Extraordinary" Case Prior to the Court's decision in Chevron, a multi-factor test was applied to tax regulations to determine whether such regulations permissibly construed a statute. 146 For almost thirty years after Chevron, deference shown to I.R.S. rulemaking depended on whether the regulations were issued pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority or pursuant to the general grant of congressional authority under I.R.C. section 7805. 147 In 2011, the Court, in Mayo Foundation for Medical Research and Education v. United States, no longer predicated the level of deference to which tax regulations were entitled on the source of their authority. 148 Mayo presented the question whether physicians who serve as medical residents were entitled to a student exemption from certain federal payroll taxes. The I.R.S. promulgated a regulation pursuant to the general grant of authority under section 7805 that denied medical residents an exemption from the applicable payroll taxes. The Court upheld the regulation under the Chevron standard. 149 The Court forcefully rejected the notion that tax regulations are somehow entitled to less deference than the regulatory action of other agencies.
. . . Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. The Court refused to apply Chevron to the Treasury regulation that entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to tax credits. 151 According to the Court, Chevron deference is underpinned by the notion that statutory ambiguities carry with them an express or implicit delegation of authority by Congress to the executive branch to resolve such ambiguities. 152 However, in extraordinary cases, this delegation of authority cannot be assumed. 153 The Court, citing, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., believed that the issue presented in the case was too central to the functioning of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act for Congress to have left it to the I.R.S. to resolve. 154 Moreover, the Court's belief was buttressed by the lack of I.R.S. expertise in crafting or enforcing health care policy -a belief not shared by the Fourth Circuit. 155 The importance of an issue should not be used as conclusive evidence of congressional intent on an issue. Instead, this factor should be considered by a court only if there is no discernable congressional intent with respect to an issue. In addition, the Court's introduction of agency expertise as a factor for consideration in resolution of this issue may very well serve to undo much of what Mayo did with respect to the status of Treasury regulations.
The Court has, in effect, used the issue of congressional delegation as part of a feedback loop used to resolve step one of Chevron: if a statute is ambiguous we then determine if the issue's importance belies congressional delegation of authority and then we determine that there is, in fact, no ambiguity. Consequently, Chevron step two is not invoked. The nature of the question presented should have no bearing on a court's inquiry into whether Congress has spoken directly to precise question at issue but should bear only on the determination whether the issue was delegated to an agency to resolve. The above quoted statement can be taken to mean that the courts' level of effort in ascertaining whether Congress has spoken to the issue depends on the nature of the question presented. Alternatively, it could be taken to mean that a court must find that Congress has spoken on the issue if the question presented is of significant importance. Neither meaning is comforting.
The statement quoted above made after the Court explained in twenty-three pages of its opinion that Congress indeed had foreclosed the FDA from regulating tobacco products. 157 It should have made no difference that this case was extraordinary. Congress's intent, as the Court exhaustively made evident, was clear. Likewise, after parsing the statute as a whole the Court came to the conclusion that Congress intended to make tax credits available to enrollees on Federal Exchanges. At that point, there is no ambiguity and the importance of the issue at hand is irrelevant.
The Court in Chevron determined that an ambiguity existed in the statute and that the EPA's resolution of the ambiguity was a reasonable accommodation of competing policy interests. The Court then noted that ". . . [i]f this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned." 158 The Court failed to explain how an accommodation that Congress would not have sanctioned could ever be a "reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care." Either the issue was committed to the agency's care or it was not.
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon stated the following in their seminal article that gave prominence to the issue in King v. Burwell:
Suppose, however, the IRS was able to convince a reviewing court that the PPACA is ambiguous on whether it limits tax credits to state-based Exchanges. The IRS would also need to demonstrate that this ambiguity was evidence of an implicit delegation of authority to interpret the statute in a way that would authorize the creation of new tax credits, new entitlement spending, and new taxes on employers and individuals beyond the purview of the traditional legislative appropriations process. This is not the sort of authority one should lightly presume Congress delegated to an agency. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, Congress does not hide such "elephants in mouseholes."
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If Congress indeed does not hide such "elephants in mouseholes" then I fail to ascertain how the I.R.S. could convince a reviewing court that an ambiguity exists to justify its action. Whether an issue is important is not relevant if Congress intended a particular result.
Under Chevron, a court first must determine whether or not the statute evidences a congressional intent with respect to the matter at hand. 160 Clarity of statutory language is, of course, the best evidence of such intent. For example, had section 36B stated that tax credits are available to eligible individuals enrolled on "any Exchange," "an Exchange established by a State or the Federal government," or, conversely, "an Exchange established by a State ( but not the Federal government or any instrumentality therefor)" the intent of Congress would have been clearly manifested by the statutory language. In many cases, Congress does not reveal its intent so obviously. Whether or not the statutory language plainly reveals Congress's intent is, of course, subject to debate and the various axioms of statutory construction exist to assist a court in the revelation of such intent.
King v. Burwell may very well find a place in the casebooks that teach statutory interpretation. The majority, in support of its position, used, by my count, three canons of statutory construction: the words of a statute must be read in context and given their place in the overall statutory scheme; federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their own stated purposes; and fundamental details of a regulatory scheme are not altered in vague or ancillary provisions. 161 The importance of the first canon noted -contextual analysis -to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy apparently varies from case to case. In the recent case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ironically another case that involved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, both the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy placed significant emphasis on the Dictionary Act's definition of "person" in reaching the conclusion that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was applicable to closely-held corporations. 162 Not to be outdone, the dissent put forth its own set of canons to refute the majority's conclusion: the plain and obvious meaning of a statute is preferable to other meanings; it is presumed that lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary signification; lawmakers do not use terms that have no operation at all; and specific terms govern over general terms. 163 The enlistment of these tools by both the majority and the dissent was made for one purpose -to answer the question of whether Congress intended for tax credits to be available to enrollees on Federal Exchanges. 164 160 Prior to Chevron, the courts did give significant weight to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretation of legislation. However, the courts were not consistent in this respect. 164 It has been suggested that this case also concerned two broader issues -the manner in which legislation is drafted and debated and the appropriateness of increasing the compliance burden on an already overburdened I.R.S. See Armando Gomez, Why Should Tax Lawyers Care About Chief Justice Roberts stated that the meaning of the term "established by the State" was ambiguous because such term reasonably could be interpreted in two ways. 165 He then proceeded to explain why Congress intended for such term to encompass Federal Exchanges. At this point, there is no more ambiguity. Chevron requires a court to determine whether the intent of Congress is ambiguous. Ambiguity of language is not the same thing as ambiguity of intent. In addition to the various canons of statutory interpretation, congressional intent can be gleaned from extraneous sources such as other legislation. The Court, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., exhaustively examined other congressional actions in determining whether Congress intended to provide the FDA with regulatory authority over tobacco. 166 The importance of the issue to an overall regulatory scheme or to the economy or to some other important matter is but a factor in the courts' inquiry with respect to congressional intent but an issue's importance should not be treated as de facto evidence that such intent existed. To do so provides the judiciary with an excuse to substitute its policy preferences for those of Congress. After all, Congress may not have intended to delegate an issue to an agency but it surely did not intend to delegate it to a court.
Ambiguity of statutory language represents either a lack of clarity on the part of the legislature in making its intent known or a lack of intent with respect to the issue at hand. The more critical and central a seeming ambiguity is to a regulatory scheme the more likely it is that the legislature intended a particular result. This is a common-sense assumption. The judiciary is tasked to determine what the law is and, in carrying out this task, the underlying policy or policies furthered by the law is fair game for judicial consideration. Separation of powers justification for Chevron deference does not diminish the courts' role in examining policy but, in fact, support it. After all, if Congress chose not to delegate authority to the executive branch then the judiciary should not grant such authority to the executive branch through the Chevron back door. Conversely, if the executive branch has been delegated authority then the judiciary should not substitute its own policy judgments for the judgment of the branch of government to which Congress deferred.
However, in many circumstances Congress has given no thought at all to the matter for one of two reasons. First, the matter either is one of implementation or is one that implicates the application of a rule to one of many possible fact patterns potentially covered by the rule that Congress passed off to an agency. It is precisely these situations that justify Chevron deference. The regulatory agencies have the policy and technical expertise to deal with such situations. Perhaps more importantly, the agencies are politically accountable through the elected executive branch officials, provide constituent participation through notice and comment procedures, 167 and have the flexibility to alter their positions as circumstances warrant.
Second, Congress never contemplated the issue at all and the importance of the issue raised makes it doubtful that Congress intended to leave the issue for the agency to resolve. It is . quite possible that social, technological, or other developments present a fact pattern that the legislature could have not foreseen. I concur with the Court that Chevron deference should not apply to these situations. However, in such situations the Court should not substitute its own policy preferences in the guise of a congressional intent that did not exist. In such cases, the courts should not enforce the regulations in question and leave the matter to Congress.
Whether an issue's importance negates or implies congressional delegation will itself be a difficult issue. One would think that King v. Burwell was an easy case in this respect. Not all disputes will be so obvious and so obviously important. Whether enrollees on Federal Exchanges qualify for tax credits is critical to the operation of the health care reform sought by the legislation, is not an obscure issue, and is not an issue that arose from a set of facts not contemplated by Congress. Precisely what Congress intended in this respect is subject to debate -as evidenced by the vigorous dissent in this case -but it is difficult to dispute the far-reaching consequences of the resolution of this dispute. Yet, in contrast to the Court, the Fourth Circuit believed that the very importance of the issue implied that Congress delegated its resolution to the I.R.S. 168 The fact that two courts drew opposite conclusions with respect to whether there was an implicit delegation of authority in this case illustrates the difficulty of ascertaining just what the Congress had in mind.
For example, let us suppose that the phrase "established by the State but not by the federal government or any instrumentality thereof)" replaced the language presently found in section 36B and that the statute and legislative history made no mention of the possibility that states and the federal government could partner to operate an Exchange. Suppose further that the Treasury Department issued regulations that defined an Exchange "established by the State but not by the federal government or any instrumentality thereof )" to include Exchanges that were operated by states in partnership with the Department of Health and Human Services. 169 This regulation would satisfy both the policy goal of insurance affordability and the policy goal of state participation. In the event that Congress contemplated that states would either form an Exchange or would not participate at all, the possibility of partial participation by a state in operating an Exchange would not have occurred to Congress at the time the legislation was deliberated and enacted. However, the importance of this issue to the overall statutory scheme would be significant if a great number of states chose to partner with the Department of Health and Human Services. Whether it is of such import to negate the implication that Congress intended the Treasury Department to deal with such a development is unclear. If it did then Chevron deference should accrue to the regulation in question. If not, then the Court should not fabricate a congressional intent when none existed and it should strike down the regulation.
A troubling aspect of the majority opinion was the question of I.R.S. expertise. Chief Justice Roberts remarked that congressional delegation of a matter so central to the operation of health insurance reform as the qualification for tax subsidies was unlikely. 170 He went on to state that the delegation of such a matter to the I.R.S. was even more unlikely given its lack of expertise in health care policy. 171 This statement -perhaps intended for effect -could undermine the equipoise that Mayo provided between the I.R.S. and other federal agencies. 172 Agency 168 See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d at 373 n.4. 169 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 170 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 171 Id. 172 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
expertise is one factor that supports Chevron deference -a factor that is, perhaps, all the more justified in an increasingly complex society. 173 Justice Ginsburg recently stated that "[t]he expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual judges issuing ad hoc, case by case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order." 174 However, tax legislation often is enacted to serve policy goals unrelated to revenue collection. For example, housing, education, health care, and retirement security policy goals are served, in part, through the tax system. 175 Will I.R.S. lack of expertise in these areas somehow subject its regulations to greater scrutiny? Does the fact that Congress expressly delegated regulatory authority to the I.R.S. in these areas inhibit the courts from considering this issue or will the courts heighten their efforts to find the issue at hand too important to have been part of that express delegation? After all, section 36B did contain an express grant of regulatory authority that the Court found could not have encompassed the authority to determine who is eligible for tax credits. 176 Arguably, the Court now has resorted to second-guessing the wisdom of the Congress not for its delegation of authority but for its choice of agency to which such authority was delegated. 175 See e.g., I.R.C. § § 25A ( providing a credit for certain educational expenses ); 36 ( providing a credit for first time homebuyers ); 105 ( providing an exclusion for employer provided medical insurance ); 213 ( providing a deduction for medical and dental expenses ); 401-409 ( providing tax deferred retirement vehicles ) ( CCH 2015 ) . 176 See supra notes 66, 106-08 and accompanying text. 177 Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act prompts the Court to slight the separation of powers. As noted at supra note 40, Hobby Lobby Stores involved the application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to three closely-held corporations whose shareholders objected, on religious grounds, to the provision of certain contraceptive services mandated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, federal government action that substantially burdens the exercise of person's religion must be justified by a compelling government interest and provide the least restrictive means in achieving this interest. See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b)(2010). The Court believed that direct government payment for the disputed services was a least restrictive means of achieving the objectives of the contraception mandate. "The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2780 ( 2014 ). The Department of Health & Human Services did not produce statistics to refute the Court's assumption that the cost of such coverage to the government would be minor. Id. at 2781. This was a bold pronouncement by the Court because the same can be said of various government benefits. This reasoning would require that, for any program not expressly exempted from Religious Freedom Restoration Act's requirements, the government either must anticipate religious objections and score the cost of providing direct government funding or be prepared to do so in litigation. Moreover, the short-term costs of government funding do not take into account dynamic factors such as the effect that modifications to existing programs will have on market prices and on the behavior of the market participants -factors often beyond the predictive
Illustrative Examples
Two relatively recent tax issues illustrate the application of Chevron to situations that Congress, most likely, did not contemplate. The first example, relating to the nuances of the mortgage interest deduction, is unlikely extraordinary. The second example deals with the application of the gift tax to contributions to social welfare organizations to support political activity. This issue may very well be deemed extraordinary.
a. Mortgage Interest Deduction
In general, taxpayers may not deduct personal interest paid or accrued during the taxable year. 178 However, excluded from the definition of personal interest is qualified residence interest. 179 Qualified residence interest is defined as interest which is paid or accrued during the taxable year either on acquisition indebtedness with respect to a qualified residence of the taxpayer or on home equity indebtedness with respect to a qualified residence of the taxpayer. 180 The amount of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness is limited to $1,000,000 and $100,000, respectively. 181 For married individuals that file separate returns, the aforementioned dollar limitations are halved. . 181 The statutory definitions of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness and the limitations thereon are as follows:
Section 163(h)(3)(B) Acquisition indebtedness. -(i) In general. -The term "acquisition indebtedness" means any indebtedness which-(I) is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer, and (II) is secured by such residence. Such term also includes any indebtedness secured by such residence resulting from the refinancing of indebtedness meeting the requirements of the preceding sentence (or this sentence); but only to the extent the amount of the indebtedness resulting from such refinancing does not exceed the amount of the refinanced indebtedness.
(ii) $1,000,000 limitation The aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for any period shall not exceed $1,000,000 ($500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return).
Section 163(h)(3) (C) Home equity indebtedness. -(i) In general The term "home equity indebtedness" means any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified residence to the extent the aggregate amount of such indebtedness does not exceed-(I) the fair market value of such qualified residence, reduced by A relatively recent Tax Court case, Sophy v. Commissioner, 183 dealt with the issue of whether the limitations on the amount of debt the interest on which qualifies for the mortgage interest deduction apply on a per-residence or per-taxpayer basis. Charles Sophy and his domestic partner each deducted an amount of interest on their individual tax returns that was determined under the assumption that the dollar limitations on the amounts of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness were available to each in full. In the aggregate, the debt on which the interest deductions were based exceeded the statutory dollar limits. Consistent with informal guidance that it previously issued, the I.R.S. asserted that the dollar limitations on acquisition and home equity indebtedness are applicable on a per-residence basis and not a pertaxpayer basis. 184 The Tax Court, based on statutory construction, held for the I.R.S. and applied the limitations on a per-residence basis. 185 An equally plausible reading of the statute leads to the opposite conclusion than that reached by the Tax Court. Section 163(h)(3)(B)(i) states that "[t]he term 'acquisition indebtedness' means any indebtedness which is incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer and is secured by such (II) the amount of acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residence.
(ii) Limitation The aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness for any period shall not exceed $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married individual). I.R.C. § § 163(h)(2)(C)(ii); 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) ( CCH 2015 ) . 182 Id. . 185 According to the court, the possessive phrases "of the taxpayer " in both the definitions of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness refer to the residence and not the debt. Thus, the reference "of the taxpayer" in the phrase that defines acquisition indebtedness "as any debt incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer" should be interpreted not to refer to the debt of the taxpayer but to the residence of the taxpayer. Sophy v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. at 210. The court believed that the statute's reference to "any debt" is not qualified by any language relating to a particular taxpayer. Therefore, the dollar limitations on acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness should be interpreted to limit the total amount of debt with respect to a particular residence and not the total amount of debt incurred by a particular taxpayer. Id. The court opined that the repeated references to "the taxpayer" throughout § 163(h) but its conspicuous absence in the debt limitation provisions was evidence that Congress did not intend the limitations to be applied on a per-taxpayer basis. Id. at 211 The court also found support for its position in the parenthetical language of § § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) and 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) which halve the limitations for married taxpayers that file separate returns. This language implies that married couples that file a joint return are subject to the $1,100,000 limitation as a couple. Id. at 212. The court dismissed the argument that the limitations imposed on married couples that file separate returns are a form of "marriage penalty." Instead, the court interpreted these limitations as a mandatory allocation of the total limitations among spouses that file separate tax returns. Id. at 213.
residence."
186 Each party incurred debt to acquire a qualified residence and each party's debt was secured by such residence. The definitional provisions are applied on a per taxpayer basis. Whether a debt meets the statutory definition is determined by whether the taxpayer incurred the debt to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a property whose use by the taxpayer qualifies the debt under the statute. For example, a co-tenancy could involve the use of the house by one co-tenant as a principal residence and the use by the other co-tenant as an investment. In such circumstances, whether the debt to acquire the property qualifies as acquisition indebtedness under § 163(h)(2)(D) is determined by each taxpayer individually.
Section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), the limitation provision, is just that -a limitation provision. As a limiting provision, it merely establishes a limit that is applied to debt that otherwise meets the requirements of the definitional section. The Tax Court's interpretation of the statute inserts a substantive provision -an aggregate limit on the total debt secured by the residence -within the limitation provision. Finally, the reduced debt limits on married couples who file separate returns can be interpreted to imply that a married couple that does file a joint return is treated as one taxpayer and this provision places married couples not so filing on the same footing. If so, then the reason that married couples that file jointly are limited in the aggregate to the debt limitations is not because the limitations are determined on a per-residence basis but because joint filers are treated as one taxpayer.
b. Gift Tax and Social Welfare Organizations
A federal gift tax is imposed for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift by any individual during such calendar year. 187 The gift tax, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1924, supplements the federal estate tax and it prevents individuals from avoiding the imposition of a wealth transfer tax through lifetime transfers.
188 Among the various transfers that are either 186 Similar language applies to home equity indebtedness. For sake of simplicity, the discussion is limited to acquisition indebtedness. 187 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) ( CCH 2015 190 Neither an exemption nor a deduction is provided for gifts made to section 501(c)(4) organizations. These organizations are a form of tax-exempt organization operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. 191 Section 501(c)(4) organizations may engage in political campaigns provided that such activity does not constitute the organization's primary activity. 192 These organizations have become increasingly important players in political campaigns because they are not subject to the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on section 527 organizations.
Congress failed to define the term "gift" and Treasury regulations define the term expansively. For gift tax purposes, gifts are not limited to transfers of property made with detached and disinterested generosity and donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the application of the tax. 193 Moreover, if the consideration received in a transaction cannot be reduced to a value in money or money's worth, such as love or affection, then such consideration is to be wholly disregarded and the transaction considered a gift in its entirety. 194 However, a sale or exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business is deemed to have been made for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 195 The Supreme Court noted that "[C]ongress intended to use the term 'gifts' in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. . . . to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech." 196 The Court also stated that "absent an express exclusion from its provisions, any transfer meeting the statutory requirements must be held subject to the gift tax." 197 The sparse case law with respect to the application of the gift tax to political contributions prior to 1975 is marked by inconsistency. 198 In Stern v. United States, the district court held that political contributions were made in return for full and adequate consideration, and thus were not gifts, because the taxpayer was not motivated by "affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses" but instead made the contributions to promote efficiency in government and to protect her property interests.
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In contrast, a federal district court, in Dupont v. United States, held that a contribution to a New York corporation formed to preserve private enterprise, private property, private initiative, and American independence was taxable for gift tax purposes. 204 The taxpayer asserted that the contribution was not a gift but a payment for services to be rendered by experts in monetary, business, and political conditions in the United States and elsewhere. 205 The court disagreed with the taxpayer's categorization of the payment and emphasized that the consideration claimed by the taxpayer in exchange for the payment was not reducible to money's worth. 206 The fact that any benefit derived by the taxpayer from the payment was enjoyed not only by the taxpayer but also by every citizen in the country made such contributions akin to the transfer of funds to a political party that shared his economic views or to a journal that shaped public opinion. 207 In 1959 the I.R.S., in a ruling, took the position that contributions to political parties or candidates were subject to gift tax. 208 The I.R.S. later reiterated its position when it announced that it would follow Stern only in the Fifth Circuit and that contributions to political parties cannot be treated as made to various candidates for purposes of applying the gift tax annual exclusion. 209 In 1982, the I.R.S. stated that it would no longer contend that contributions made to political organizations described in section 527 prior to May 8, 1974 were subject to gift tax. 210 However, the I.R.S. made clear its position that gratuitous transfers to organizations not described in section 527 are subject to gift tax regardless of whether such contributions are motivated to advance the donor's social, political, or charitable objectives. 211 This issue remained dormant until the run-up to the 2012 election at which time the I.R.S. resurrected it temporarily.
The campaign finance landscape has changed significantly since 1975 as a result of both legislative changes and Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo, held that the regulation of political expenditures could reach only coordinated expenditures or expenditures that funded express advocacy. 213 This holding opened the door to increased issue advocacy expenditures by political parties -so-called "soft money." 214 However, the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act in 2002 resulted in the prohibition of the use of "soft money" by political parties. 215 As a result, section 527 organizations increased in prominence. After Buckley, only political organizations that engage in express advocacy or that coordinate their activities with a candidate, candidate's committee, or political party are subject to regulation by the F.E.C. 216 Many activities of section 527 organizations do not amount to express advocacy and, accordingly, are outside the scope of the campaign finance rules. 217 However, all section 527 organizations are subject to disclosure requirements, similar to those required under the campaign finance rules, that are administered by the I.R.S. 218 Campaign practices underwent a sea change as a result of the Court's landmark decision in Citizens United v. FEC. 219 A far-reaching effect of Citizens United was its refusal to sanction statutory restrictions on independent express advocacy expenditures, corporate or otherwise. 220 Thus, the ability to regulate expenditures was no longer dependent, as it had been since Buckley, on whether expenditures funded either express advocacy or, alternatively, were coordinated. Instead, regulatory power is now dependent upon whether or not the expenditures in question are independent. On March 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Citizens United compelled it to strike down the contribution limitations imposed on donors to a section 527 organization that fell under the definition of a political committee. 221 The court reasoned that the constitutional protection afforded by Citizens United to independent political expenditures, including express advocacy expenditures, extends to contributions to organizations that make such expenditures. 222 As a result, the Super PAC, the colloquial term for a political committee that may receive and spend unlimited amounts for independent expenditures, was born. Although issue advocacy section 527 organizations are not considered political committees for purposes of the campaign finance law, they are subject to the tax code's reporting and disclosure requirements. 223 Enter social welfare organizations into the political fray. 224 Statutory support exists for the position that contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations are taxable. Section 2501(a)(1) imposes a tax on transfers of property by gift and, absent a statutory exclusion or deduction, any transfer by gift is subject to tax. Congress provided a deduction for gifts to most section 501(c)(3) organizations and several other types of organizations. 225 Congress's silence with respect to donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations, in combination with its special treatment of contributions to section 527, section 501(c)(3), and certain other organizations, can be interpreted, under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to subject donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations to tax. 226 Moreover, Congress had plenty of notice of the I.R.S.'s position on this issue and it failed to codify an exception for transfers to section 501(c)(4) organizations. The tax code disfavors political contributions in many respects and the imposition of a gift tax on such contributions would not be out of character for Congress. 227 Finally, many transfers that do not contribute to family wealth accumulation are taxable -gifts to non-relatives, for example. If the purpose of wealth transfer taxes was solely to prevent family accumulations of wealth then Congress could have limited their application to transfers that advanced that purpose. Wealth taxes also raise revenue and that objective should not be overlooked. Several arguments support an exemption for contributions to section 501(c)(4) organizations. First, the codification of an exception for donations to section 527 political organizations can be interpreted as Congress making explicit what had already been implied and not as a change in the law. Moreover, the limitation of the statutory exclusion to donations to section 527 political organizations reflected the practices of the times -section 501(c)(4) organizations would not play a significant political role for more than three decades. 228 Additionally, the legislative history of the gift tax exemption for contributions to political organizations indicates that Congress did not want the tax system to discourage political contributions and that the application of the tax to donations to section 501(c)(4) organizations is at odds with congressional intent.
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Let's assume that Treasury regulations are issued that apply a per residence limitation on the mortgage interest deduction and subject contributions to social welfare organizations to the gift tax. Are either, neither, or both of these regulations entitled to Chevron deference? Perhaps the Tax Court's interpretation of the interest deduction provision in Sophy is the correct one and perhaps not. The provision in question was enacted in 1987. It is likely that Congress gave no thought to the possibility of unmarried cohabitants living in residences encumbered by mortgage debt in excess of the dollar limitation -which in 1987 dollars was quite significant. As discussed above, the statutory language is subject to two reasonable but contradictory interpretations. Most likely, this issue would be viewed by a court as one of the innumerable issues that were bound to occur in the implementation of the statute the resolution of which Congress handed off to the I.R.S.
230 Accordingly, Chevron deference should be accorded to the regulations. With respect to the gift tax issue, the preceding arguments and counterarguments do not consider whether the campaign finance statutes and their legislative history support or undermine the I.R.S.'s position -a consideration well beyond the scope of this work. It is possible that the communicating directly with certain executive branch officials. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)( CCH 2015 ). Moreover, dues paid to certain tax-exempt organizations that are allocable to such activities are similarly non-deductible. I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) ( CCH 2015 ). Deductions for certain indirect contributions to political parties, such as advertising in convention programs and other publications and admission costs to dinners and inaugural events are also not deductible. I.R.C. § 276(a)( CCH 2015 ). Except for banks, taxpayers are prohibited from taking bad deductions or losses from worthlessness of debts owed by political parties. I.R.C. § 271( CCH 2015 ). 228 See supra notes 213-24 and accompanying text. 229 See S.Rep.No. 93-1357, at 31 ( 1974 ) . 230 On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that a court, because this issue implicated the treatment of same-sex couples and the role of tax incentives in effectuating federal housing policy, could believe that Congress would not have left its resolution to the agency. Chief Justice Roberts casually dismissed any analogy between § 36B and the tax credit for first time homebuyers on the ground that the latter credit is not central to federal housing policy. King v. Burwell, 192 L.Ed.2d at 501 n.5. It is unlikely that a court would consider the manner in which the mortgage interest deduction limitation is applied as central to federal housing policy. intent of Congress with respect to this issue is indeed ambiguous and, if so, that determination should be made without regard to whether or not the issue is important and central to campaign practices and, thus, would unlikely have been delegated to the I.R.S. Only after such a determination is made should the importance of the issue become relevant. If implicit delegation of authority to the I.R.S. exists then Chevron deference should apply. If no such delegation took place then the Chevron deference is inapplicable, the regulation struck down, and the issue sent back to Congress.
Whether an issue is important should not affect a court's efforts in ascertaining the intent of Congress. After all, one would, and should, expect a court to make the same effort to ascertain Congress's intent in both situations described above. If Congress gave no thought to the matter then whether the policy implications are important or whether the I.R.S. has the expertise to effectuate social, housing, and campaign finance policies should not be an excuse for a court to divine a non-existent congressional intent. If Congress did not speak to the issue and did not delegate the authority for an agency to speak on the issue then the regulation should be struck down and the issue returned to Congress. Otherwise, the court will have delegated to itself the authority that it denied an agency. Justice Stevens stated that
[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges --who have no constituency --have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
Federal taxpayer standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923 case of Frothingham v. Mellon. 235 In that case, a taxpayer alleged that the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, by encroaching on areas that were traditionally the states' domain, violated the Tenth Amendment and that the federal expenditures under the statute increased her tax bill in violation of due process. 236 The Court denied the taxpayer standing stating that the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax liability was "too remote, fluctuating, and uncertain" and that "her interest in moneys of the Treasury" was "shared with millions of others." 237 According to the Court, federal judicial power can be invoked by a party upon a showing "not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." 238 In a relatively recent decision, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, the Court made clear that Frothingham applies with equal force to taxpayer challenges to state tax and spending provisions. 239 The Court has been similarly unreceptive to suits brought by members of Congress that allege an injury to such members' lawmaking powers. In Raines v. Byrd several members of Congress claimed that the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutionally rendered their votes on appropriation bills less effective. 240 Despite the fact that the statute expressly conferred standing to members of Congress, the Court held that such injury was "wholly abstract and widely dispersed" and thus not cognizable. 241 The Court made clear that Article III barriers to standing cannot be removed by a congressional grant of standing. 242 Justice Souter pointedly invoked the separation of powers rationale for the denial of standing to members of Congress for alleged institutional injuries. 243 A congressperson's standing will require an allegation of personal, as opposed to institutional, injury. 244 Legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the absence of a particularized individual harm if they undertake the challenge in a representational capacity. In a recent federal district court case a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to enforce a subpoena issued by the committee to a member of the executive branch. 245 In INS v. Chadha, a federal statute that permitted either house of Congress to overrule a decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States was held unconstitutional upon challenge by the petitioner alien. 246 The Ninth Circuit permitted Congress to intervene and defend the constitutionality of the statute and stated that ". . . Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional." 247 However, because the Court held that the petitioner maintained standing in the case it was not necessary for Congress to maintain standing in its own right in order to intervene. 248 
United States v. Windsor,
249 the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act ( DOMA ), raised standing issues similar to Chadha. The respondent challenged the constitutionality of DOMA after she was assessed an estate tax deficiency. The deficiency arose because the respondent, married under state law to a same-sex partner, was not deemed married for federal estate tax purposes due to the application of DOMA. 250 The Bipartisan Litigation Advisory Group ( BLAG ) of the House of Representatives petitioned to intervene to defend the statute as an interested party after being notified by the Attorney General that the Department of Justice would not defend the statute's constitutionality. 251 Because the Court held that the petitioner and respondent maintained standing it did not decide whether BLAG had standing its own right. 252 Justices Alito and Thomas, however, believed that BLAG did have standing to defend the statute and they would maintain the standing of a member of Congress to defend the constitutionality of any statute provided that the member has the institutional imprimatur to do so. "Accordingly, in the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress has both the standing to defend the undefended statute and is a proper party to do so." 253 In King v. Burwell, the I.R.S. interpreted the tax credit expansively. Section 36B is not a typical credit provision because the availability of the credit has consequences beyond the reduction of a taxpayer's tax liability. Credit eligibility is a factor in determining insurance affordability and, therefore, could trigger the individual mandate for a taxpayer. 254 Moreover, credit eligibility could also trigger the employer mandate. 255 Consequently, standing is not an issue because, despite the seemingly taxpayer-favorable nature of the I.R.S. regulations, particularized harms could occur to certain taxpayers.
However, let's assume for the moment that section 36B did nothing more than reduce a taxpayer's tax liability and that the legislation clearly reflected the intent of Congress to limit tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges. Despite the fact that the Court believed that the tax credits were an integral part of the health insurance reform effort -an extraordinary case -no one could maintain standing to challenge the regulations. The fact that such a situation could be resolved through the political process does not distinguish it from the situation in King. If the dissent's view carried the day then the political process could have been invoked to achieve the opposite result. If Congress did not delegate authority to an agency to act in "extraordinary" situations then the invocation of the separation of powers rationale -the same rationale that denies the applicability of Chevron -should not depend on whether an agency's illegitimate exercise of power solely benefits taxpayers. between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawful licensed and performed by another state. 256 The "Take Care" Clause is not hortatory. It imposes a duty upon the President -"he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 257 The Court has seen fit to create exceptions to its traditional aversion to taxpayer standing. Under Flast v. Cohen, taxpayer standing is maintained for challenges to congressional spending and taxing decisions that allegedly violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 258 According to Flast, the Establishment Clause protects an interest important enough to justify an exception to the Court's traditional aversion to taxpayer standing. 259 Flast can be taken as evidence that the Court's standing jurisprudence is rooted more in prudential concerns than Article III constitutional impediments.
Surely the assertion that an agency has not been delegated the power to act by Congress raises an issue of sufficient import to overcome the standing barriers. The Court, at a minimum, should grant a member of Congress standing to challenge agency action if the agency acted without express or implied authority. If an issue is of such significance -an extraordinary casethat it belies congressional delegation of authority to an agency to act as it did then to deny anyone the ability to challenge agency action is fundamentally inconsistent with the separation of powers foundation for the Court's refusal to invoke Chevron for the resolution of important questions. Such an exception would apply only to "extraordinary "cases and, therefore, would raise few prudential concerns.
CONCLUSION
Whether one believes that the Court deserves praise or criticism for its holding in King v. Burwell is, I suspect, based on the result for which one hoped. This was not an easy case of statutory interpretation. I agree with the Court that an implied delegation of authority by Congress to the I.R.S. to resolve the issue of tax credit availability was unlikely. This case presented an issue central and critical to the policies underlying the legislation and was an issue so obvious that Congress surely intended some result. However, the Court's reasoning with respect to the application of Chevron in the extraordinary case in which Congress retained for itself the resolution of an issue is troubling. Its reasoning appears to offer the courts an excuse to take for itself what Congress reserved for itself.
